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SCIENCE FICTION AND LIFE AFTER DEATH 
 
Science fiction is, and has been since its inception as a self-conscious genre, 
centrally and persistently interested in presenting some version or some figure for an 
afterlife, some way to survive the death of the body, some place where our consciousness 
might live on after we die. We can find representations of an afterlife within every period 
of science fiction properly so-called, from late 19th century "scientific romance" to 
Campbellian magazine fiction, to the New Wave of the 1960s, to the present day; within 
every subgenre specific to science fiction (time travel, space opera, post-apocalyptic 
fiction, first contact story, etc.); and within the works of most, if not all, its influential 
writers. We can find these representations as aspects of setting, character and plot, and as 
persistent figures and symbols, not everywhere, but very frequently, in sf, once we start 
to look. In saying so I offer not a new definition, nor a new general theory of how sf 
works, but rather a distinctive, persistent feature to explore and explain.1 
 
Sf’s persistent afterlives admit several overlapping explanations: for one thing, sf 
is the literature of the future, and it cannot help coming up with symbols for its own habit 
of imagining what will happen after we die. For another thing, sf’s string of symbols for 
the afterlife enables the genre to reflect on itself: they present it as a means of escape 
(from this life, from the constraints of the real) and as a way to reflect on why we tell 
stories. Above all, though, the wealth of ways in which sf represents the afterlife casts 
new light on the relations between science fiction and religious faith.2 The pervasive 
presence of life after death in sf calls into further question the already controversial 
claims (the best-known is Darko Suvin’s) that sf, as a genre, must favor the rational, or 
the empirical.  At the same time, that presence supports recent claims (such as those by 
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr.) about the variety of imaginative powers that science fiction 
can contain. 
 
Once we see the persistence of ideas about the afterlife through twentieth and 
twenty-first century science fiction, we can recognize nineteenth-century fictions and 
suppositions about the afterlife among science fiction’s progenitors. The persistence of 
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the afterlife within sf shows how much we readers, past and present, want to imagine 
some version of life after death. If we do not find or accept it in revealed religion, we 
may look for it—as so many earlier Americans did—within the precincts of the 
empirically verifiable; and if we do not find it there either, then we may seek it, and go on 
seeking it, in science fiction, bolstered by sf’s peculiar powers to project a future 
imagined as comprehensible, yet characterized by forms of life that we do not know.  If 
science (however understood) cannot provide the desiderata of faith, then science 
fiction—under erasure, or faute de mieux—might; and none of those desiderata have 
seemed more contested, more subject to proof or disproof, in the late nineteenth, 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, than life after death. 
 
    * 
 
Perhaps the most famous opening sentence in American science fiction, the first 
line of William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984), contemplates a place where the dead 
might belong, up above us, in an electronic medium: “The sky above the port was the 
color of television, tuned to a dead channel” (1). Indeed the novel and its sequels have 
everything to do with “dead channels,” with where the dead go, and with how they can 
return. Restored to professional life from near-corpselike despair, Gibson’s protagonist 
Case has to collaborate with ghostlike programs, learning to "work with the dead" inside 
the "consensual hallucination" that is cyberspace (49, 51). Case’s ally the Dixie Flatline 
is the digitized consciousness of a man who died twice, having had a near-death 
experience online; he says that he wants to be "erased... for good" (106). The sequels to 
Neuromancer teem with other digital spaces inhabited by "ghosts of... evil ancestors": the 
hacker hero Bobby (a.k.a. Count Zero) ends up in digital storage, "getting unconscious 
and just staying jacked in" in an afterlife beyond the afterlife, where even the "ghosts in 
the corporate cores" cannot go (Mona Lisa Overdrive, 137-39; Neuromancer, 229).  
 
 Ray Bradbury’s Martian Chronicles (1950) is a veritable anthology of afterlives. 
In Bradbury’s “Mars Is Heaven!” American astronauts find there their own deceased 
relatives: one astronaut's grandmother says she has been living on Mars "ever since we 
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died" (41). Eric Rabkin writes that on this Mars, “Heaven, or the vision of heaven shaped 
from our own longing, is a fatal snare”: Martians trap astronauts there and then kill them 
all (“Is Mars Heaven?” 95). Elsewhere in Bradbury, though, the red planet does harbor 
versions of life after death. Bradbury’s Martians are ghost-like—insubstantial, perhaps 
immortal, relics of a defunct civilization. In Bradbury’s “Night Meeting,” a human meets 
a Martian and exclaims, "if I am real, then you must be dead.'" Their exchange continues: 
 
"Don't you see the city there?" The Martian pointed. 
Tomás looked and saw the ruins. "Why, that city's been dead thousands of years." 
The Martian laughed. "Dead? I slept there yesterday!” (83) 
 
No sf author has seemed more important, in recent years, to American literary and 
popular culture than Philip K. Dick, as the many films made from Dick’s work and the 
successful repackagings of his oeuvre imply; and representations of the afterlife—at once 
desirable and horrible, illusory and ineluctable—dominate Dick's settings, on Earth and 
in space. In UBIK (1969), for example, most of the characters discover in chapter twelve 
that they died in chapter six. They must then figure out whether they inhabit a real society 
made up of other dead minds, or a hallucination produced by imperfect storage of their 
still-thinking corpses in a "moratorium"; the answer may be "both" (187). 
 
 Gibson and Bradbury, though exemplary and influential, may seem like easy 
cases for a general claim that sf depicts many afterlives, since both treat religious faith 
with consistent respect: neither writes the kind of “hard” or “hardcore” science fiction 
that glorifies reason, scientists and engineers.3 Dick, another author central to American 
sf but opposed to its rationalism, might seem an easier case still.  And yet we can also 
find versions and symbols of life after death in the most resolutely empiricist and 
rationalist precincts of American sf, such as the early fiction of Robert A. Heinlein, 
whose "Universe" and "Common Sense" (1940-41) turn their historical futures and outer-
space places into replacements for religious versions of Heaven. The novellas take place 
on a generation ship, where a long-ago mutiny eliminated most knowledge of how it 
works and what its builders intended. Priests called "scientists" interpret "sacred books" 
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such as "Basic Modern Physics" allegorically, without understanding what "gravity" (for 
instance) really means. The young hero Hugh must demonstrate, like Galileo, that such 
beliefs are mistakes, and in doing so redefine all the words (“trip,” for instance) that 
pertain to death, or to life after death, or to Heaven. Those shipmates "did not believe 
there was such a place as Outside," that is, outer space.  Instead, their vernacular equates 
travel with death: to "make the Trip" is to die (20, 136, 75). 
 
 Even this story, with its "Campbellian... pro-scientific method agenda"(as Brooks 
Landon put it), ends up insisting that there is another life, and a space fit for that life, 
outside the world and the bodies we know (33). To move through the sf of the Campbell 
era with life after death in mind is to see how ably its key topoi—its space ventures, its 
aliens, even its robots—lend themselves to reinterpretation as figures for resurrection, for 
life extension, for Heaven or Purgatory or reincarnation, a reinterpretation that begins 
exactly where their claim to explain existing science must end. Even so un-mystical a 
project as Isaac Asimov’s robot stories entails as a set of questions, not only about 
whether robots count as alive, but about whether they might be brought back from the 
dead: one of the first such stories, “Liar!” (1941), ends with Asimov’s ultra-rational hero 
Susan Calvin contemplating a “living-dead” “thinking robot,” disabled by having to 
contemplate a paradox: Calvin declares him alive, in effect, by mourning him, angry 
because “he’ll never speak again” (295). 
 
 To see why sf so often makes the afterlife central, we can go back to before sf 
properly so-called began. Though many critics have investigated science fiction and 
religion generally, only one, the British philosopher Stephen R. L. Clark, appears to have 
examined science fictional treatments of immortality (his term) at length.4 Yet the overlap 
between science fiction as such and ideas of an afterlife goes back before the birth of the 
terms “science fiction,” “scientifiction,” “scientific romance”: the prehistory of American 
science fiction includes not only (as other critics have noted) the Gothic, the fable, the 
triumphalist narrative of invention and the tall tale, but also the many nonfictional, and 
some fictional, nineteenth-century accounts of life after death.5  
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The worlds described by nineteenth-century American spiritualism can look like 
science fiction avant la lettre, except that it did not regard itself as fictive. “Nineteenth-
century spiritualism,” Justine Murison writes, “was, at root, a newly energized faith in the 
endurance of the soul in the afterlife, but one seemingly based on and proven by 
empirical evidence,” akin to “electricity and telegraphy” (138, 142). “Spiritualists’ 
embrace of the modern revelations of science and technology,” agrees Molly McGarry, 
“was more than an analogy; communicating by telegraph must have seemed no less 
magical than speaking to the dead” (14).  One investigator, the Mormon Orson Pratt, 
promised a “spiritual telegraph”; another, Andrew Jackson Davis, invoked magnets and 
batteries to explain his communications from the spirit world, in what Catherine 
Albanese calls “a borderline scientific discourse” (178, 226).  Spiritualist feats itemized 
by McGarry correspond to various kinds of afterlives imagined later in sf (and 
taxonomized below): mediums could not only communicate with another world, but also 
leave their bodies to go elsewhere in this world, or into what the medium Cora Richmond 
(quoted by McGarry) called a “super-mundane realm” (60). Such doctrines have been 
followed ably by historians of religion, who trace their successors, outside the realms of 
imaginative literature, through the twentieth century.6 But these sorts of models, 
concerned with spirit and with life after death but dependent on the language of science, 
also fed into the later stream of fiction conscious of itself as fiction, concerned with 
science and with spirit at once. 
 
 By far the most commercially successful of fictions about the afterlife in America, 
Elizabeth Stuart Phelps’s The Gates Ajar (1868) spoke of a happy and easily understood 
afterlife to a public much bereaved. The novel sold at least 80,000 copies in the United 
States, and 100,000 in Britain, by 1900 (vi); it launched Phelps’ life as a professional 
writer (she produced several sequels), and it stands behind several parodies, including 
Mark Twain’s “Captain Stanfield Enters Heaven” (1908). The Gates Ajar is neither a 
work of science fiction nor a supernatural vision; all of it takes place on Earth, in the 
present day, and much of it consists of talks between the narrator, Mary, who has just lost 
her brother, and Aunt, Winifred, who persuades Mary that Heaven must be full of human 
pleasures—what Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang, in Heaven: A History, call 
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“anthropocentric”—rather than austerely focused on God (“theocentric”).  (Bradbury’s 
“Mars Is Heaven!” echoes Aunt Winifred’s beliefs.) 
 
 The Gates Ajar is thin indeed as a novel, but it is a passionate brief for the 
anthropocentric Heaven, for “the consciousness, happiness and tangibility of the life into 
which we immediately pass,” in which “our absent dead are very present with us” (76, 
60).  Even this novel, so focused on hearth and home, so concerned that Heaven should 
have a familiar face (and be full of familiar faces), adopts the language of scientific 
discovery, in this case telescopic astronomy, as if its own arguments about Heaven were 
one more experimental discovery: “perhaps,” says Aunt Winifred, “the mysteries of 
sidereal systems will be spread out like a child’s map before us. Perhaps we shall take 
journeys to Jupiter and to Saturn and to the glittering haze of nebulae, and to the site of 
ruined worlds whose ‘extinct light is yet travelling through space’” (110).  
 
 To found ideas of life after death on anything other than revelation was, perforce, 
to found them on something like science. Phelps was not the first American fiction writer 
to present life after death: George Wood called his own book Future Life, or Scenes from 
Another World (1858) “the first to portray... the possible scenes of a future life” in accord 
both with mainstream Protestant doctrine (he held Swedenborgians in contempt) and with 
a climate of trust in experiment: “all our ideas of the future must be formed of the present 
life; nor can we reach outside of a physical theory” (ix, vii). As McDannell and Lang 
explain, the “active, progressive heaven filled with service and spiritual growth” which 
mainstream Protestant sermons would describe was very much like the afterlife whose 
existence mediums’ “scientific” evidence claimed to prove (293).  Both Spiritualist and 
mainstream Protestant heavens—both “anthropocentric,” in McDannell and Lang’s 
terms— could look, in turn, like secular Utopias. The future society of Edward Bellamy’s 
extraordinarily influential novel Looking Backward 1887-2000 (1887), with its physical 
comfort and its lack of decadent luxury, its harmonious social relations and its division of 
useful tasks, resembles the versions of Heaven expounded by many American Christians 
in the 1880s and beyond.7  
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 As American heavens looked more and more like this Earth, American and 
British investigators committed to this-worldly methods tried to say more about a life 
beyond. The philosopher Paul Carus in 1893 called "the preservation of soul-life after the 
death of the individual... a scientific truth which can be proved” (quoted in Jackson 116). 
William James addressed The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902) to readers who 
feared that "the Science of Nature" had taken away the sense of purpose in religion—and, 
James concedes, "Religion... for the great majority of our own race means immortality" 
(387, 412). Four years earlier, James had published Human Immortality, in which he 
called life after death “one of the great spiritual needs of man” (2): 
 
One hears not only physiologists, but numbers of laymen who read the popular 
science books and magazines, saying all about us, How can we believe in life 
hereafter when Science has once for all attained to proving, beyond possibility of 
escape, that our inner life is a function... of our cerebral convolutions? (7) 
 
Human Immortality nonetheless tried to show how "the life," or the soul, "may still 
continue when the brain itself is dead." Brains might receive, rather than generate, souls' 
transmissions, as in wireless telegraphy; brains might be "colored lenses in the wall of 
nature, admitting light from the super-solar source” (12, 19). To look at the limits of 
science, for William James, was to ask about the future of that emotionally crucial, 
apparently unscientific construct, the soul; and to think about the preservation of the soul, 
or the person, beyond death was—for at least some writers (James among them)— to ask 
where science became a metaphor, where its investigations could lead, or would end.   
 
 No wonder, then, that founding works of what we now call science fiction offer 
durable figures for life beyond death: indeed, H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine (1895) 
offers a new symbol for the afterlife in almost every chapter, combining its extrapolations 
of social (class separation) and physical (entropy) trends with topoi from Christianity and 
from Greek myth: the Purgatorial far-future beach, the Eloi's Elysium, the Morlocks' hell. 
The Time Traveler also undertakes repeated (and failed) attempts at the epic nekuia, 
"hammering at the gates of" a museum that has become a mausoleum, and then trying to 
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"penetrat[e] these mysteries of underground" (33, 42). Wells' Time Traveler becomes 
both author-surrogate and tomb-raider, discovering secrets that belong to the dead: 
Joanna Russ goes so far as to call The Time Machine “a series of deaths” (8). Wells’s The 
First Men in the Moon (1901), despite its insistently satirical focus, also finds room for 
journeys to the underworld, for images of what might happen after we die. Its anti-heroes 
Cavor and Bedford journey into and under the moon, finding “caverns beneath caverns, 
tunnel, structures, ways”; Bedford confronts “the Eternal, that which was before the 
beginning and that which triumphs over the end; that enormous void,” and when he 
leaves the moon for outer space, “it was almost as though I had been killed” (128, 139, 
142). 
 
We can find later sf heroes as tomb raiders, opening up a space that belongs to the 
dead, in Jack London’s "The Red One" (1918); in Bradbury and in Gibson. We find them 
again in the "tomb world" of Mercerist religion in Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? (1968) and in the Time Tombs of Dan Simmons' space opera Hyperion (1989). 
And we can find them in Gene Wolfe's novella "Memorare” (2004), with its hollowed-
out, hallucinogenic asteroid, to whose deceptive attractions I will return. Sf as time travel 
can become sf as tomb travel; to see the future is to see oneself as dead. Yet such an 
equation held risks for a genre still coalescing: to incorporate tomb raiders into scientific 
romance, for Wells, was to risk subsuming the genre into existing categories of 
supernatural fiction.8 No wonder, then, that The Time Machine works self-consciously to 
distinguish its new genre from spiritualism: "no kind of trick" like the tricks of table-
rappers "could have been played on us" (9).  
 
In 1910, fifteen years after The Time Machine and fifteen before Hugo Gernsback 
coined the term "scientifiction," there appeared an anthology called In After Days: 
Thoughts on the Future Life, whose eminent American contributors responded to the 
promise of the title. "Life is scarcely more than an experiment in vivisection," mused 
William Lyon Phelps, "if death is the end of personality” (33). In Henry James's 
elaborately hedged contribution (called, simply, "Is There Life After Death?"), the 
possibilities for utopian fiction and the idea of a plausible Heaven converge: "as we can 
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scarce have too many visions, too many statements or pictures of the conceived social 
Utopia that the sincere fond dreamer, the believer in better things, may find glimmer 
before him," James wrote, "so the sincere and struggling son of earth among his fellow-
strugglers reports of the positive or negative presumption in the savor of his world, that is 
not to be of earth" (202). The readers of 1910 seek (and rightly so, James says) utopian 
fictions for just the same reasons that they want to read about life after death. We may not 
be surprised, then, that in 1902, eight years before "Is There a Life After Death?," and 
two weeks after reading Wells's The First Men in the Moon, James offered to "labour... in 
sweet unison" with Wells on a projected novel about Mars (Edel and Ray 81, 83). 
 
     * 
 
We have already seen that major sf authors—Gibson, Dick, Wells, Heinlein, and 
others— incorporate symbols and versions of life after death into seminal sf works; we 
have seen that the prehistory of sf includes fiction and nonfiction about the survival of the 
soul beyond death. The most powerful explanations for this trend have to do with the role 
of revealed religion, with our pervasive wish to imagine—or to suspend our disbelief 
in—life after death; they also have to do with the relationship between sf and experienced 
time. If sf is the literature of the imagined future, then it must let us imagine what 
happens after we die; and if sf is the literature of the cognitively explicable, the 
empirically verifiable, and yet also the literature of wonder, of the unknowable, the 
unreal, it must attempt to imagine life after death, that matter that has rested for so long 
(since “spiritual telegraphy,” since William James) at the boundary of fact and faith. 
 
 I have not, so far, maintained a consistent distinction between familiar symbols 
for the afterlife, as appropriated by authors of science fiction (such as Wells’s 
underworlds and tunnels) and versions of life after death that occur literally within 
science fictional worlds, as character, setting or plot (such as Gibson’s Dixie Flatline,). I 
have not done so in part because, as Samuel R. Delany, Seo-Young Chu and others have 
argued, it is in the nature of science fiction to reverse or collapse the boundary between 
the literal and the figurative; I have also wanted to show the rich trove of figures, within 
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sf, for life after death (Delany 296; Chu 10).9  That said, we can see more about why the 
afterlife appears so often in science fiction, why it has mattered to so many sf works, if 
we try to classify the ways in which life after death can enter a science fictional plot, as 
something that affects what its characters do, as well as what they feel and believe. 
 
These science-fictional versions of the afterlife may be divided into at least four 
types.10 The first, the most common, involve life extension and future histories, following 
the same person in the same physical body, including both very long-lived (but mortal) 
characters and literal immortality, and including, also, the “sleeper wakes” plots (such as 
Bellamy’s) whereby people from one time end up in another that, absent the science 
fictional novum, neither we, nor the characters, would see.  The second are stories of, and 
symbols for, life outside the body, in which the soul or the mind continue in some 
nonphysical or nonlocal form. The third are stories in which people who die, or people 
who would have been dead, or people who seem like the dead, are given new bodies: 
resurrected, or reincarnated. The fourth are stories in which time travel, or disrupted and 
unfamiliar temporalities, give people (both readers and characters) a chance to step 
outside the normal one-way lifespan of secular time, in which we are born and travel one 
way towards death. 
 
These four kinds are not exclusive: they can coexist in one text. Indeed, 
Neuromancer and The Martian Chronicles, and such other prominent sf works as Dick’s 
The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch (1965), arguably contain them all. Yet to separate 
them, however briefly, is to see how powerful and how pervasive motifs of life after 
death (with or without—pace Clark—immortality proper) have been. Each kind allows us 
to say something more about how and why science fiction, the literature of cognitive 
estrangement, contains and handles versions of life beyond death; each kind offers 
science fiction a new way to comment on its own relation to (sometimes, its rivalry with) 
revealed religion, and a new way to describe itself. 
 
 There is nothing new in the claim that sf includes future history, that it deploys a 
“power to mediate the relationship between the human present and the future” (as 
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Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. put it), nor in the claim—advanced by Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., Suvin, 
and Fredric Jameson, among others— that sf, as the literature of a comprehensible future, 
permits us to imagine radical historical change (78). Characters who become immortal, or 
exceptionally long-lived, or who advance in time beyond their peers, act out 
intradiegetically, within their own consciousness, the experience of futurity that happens 
to readers extradiegetically, when we read sf. At the same time, they imagine what 
happens after we die. Sf authors can make readers conscious of that dual imagination. 
 
 We can find that dual effect—future history on the one hand, life beyond death on 
the other-- in the most critically acclaimed recent sf to feature life extension, Kim Stanley 
Robinson's Mars trilogy (1992-96), in which several generations of settlers build new 
societies on a climatologically transformed Mars. Thanks to new technologies, some of 
the first human settlers on Mars live for hundreds of years, through failed and successful 
revolutions. Like readers of science fiction, like spirits in Heaven, they see what happens 
to the living long after they themselves expected to die. One of those first settlers, Maya 
Toitovna, muses near the end of the trilogy "that the significance of everything always 
lay just out of reach, in the future, tugging them forward" (587, 630). Another early 
settler, the grim and sometimes suicidal Ann Clayborne (note the name) leads a faction 
that wants to keep Mars unchanged, "red" and dead. "A figure of desperate mourning" (in 
Jameson's words), Ann and her faction loses their contest, and the trilogy can end only 
once Ann accepts a transformed, fertile Mars as "new... life": "she was a new Ann now... 
A fully Martian Ann at last... And if there was a Terran Ann still in there... that was life" 
(Jameson, “If I Find One Good City” 57; Robinson 754). It is as if she had outlived 
herself and been resurrected: Robinson's Mars becomes Ann's Heaven too. 
 
Mars has long seemed especially appropriate for science fictional afterlives, not 
only to Bradbury and Robinson, and not only in stories of future history and life 
extension. The red planet has for over a century, Robert Markley writes, given American 
writers a "metaphor of a dying world" that "confronts its readers with the specter of 
extinction." Visible since antiquity, supposed to contain dry channels or “canals,” Mars 
seemed to the popular imagination in the late nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century to 
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hold the remains of a dying civilization. (Wet, cloudy and hot, the Venus of popular 
fiction held Orientalized tropical barbarians instead.)  In "several influential novels," 
Markley explains, "Mars becomes the site of a Christian afterlife"; the earliest dates to 
1889 (6, 117, 189). The dead future displaces the living present on Philip K. Dick's Mars 
as well: that is what the title of Martian Time-Slip (1964) implies and what the visionary 
psychotic Manfred, in that novel, foresees.11 To be on Mars is to inhabit a space that 
belongs to the dead, and to join the tradition of posthumous spaces that Markley 
identifies.12 
 
 The second sort of sf afterlife gives us personal survival outside any body, in 
cyberspace, as a computer program, or in some other immaterial world.  In James Tiptree 
Jr.'s Up the Walls of the World (1978) the souls of alienated human beings and the souls 
of displaced flying aliens end up as part of a giant ether cloud, an immaterial heaven 
whose “intimations of divinity, but never more than that” make it, as Csicsery-Ronay 
writes, a perfect example of the “science-fictional sublime” (181). Whether in deep space 
or in a computer network, these immaterial afterlives provide especially salient figures 
not just for the heaven of religions but for the experience of reading, especially that of 
reading sf: you, reader, leave your body and lose yourself in a network of information 
you did not build.  
 
This paired sense of death as escape from the body and of reading—especially 
reading science fiction—as a version of Heaven pervades Tiptree's works: in Tiptree’s 
story "Slow Music" (1980), almost every human being has entered an incorporeal 
afterlife called "The River," a "magnificence to which this [Earth] was nothing." The 
contrarian heroine resolves "to stay on this Earth and do human things," "to make young 
ones to carry on the race, even if I have to die here,” and yet she too, gets taken up into 
the River, along with the last man who could have impregnated her (460, 470). "Slow 
Music" also identifies science fictional afterlives with traditions of literary mourning. A 
dying writer, a woman disguised as a man, an obvious analog for Tiptree herself, recites 
William Butler Yeats's poem "The Cold Heaven": 
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He coughed, no longer looking at them, and began to murmur in the archaic tongue, 
"Ah, when the ghost begins to quicken, confusion of the deathbed over, is it sent... out 
naked on the roads as the books say, and stricken with the injustice of the stars for 
punishment? The injustice of the stars..." He fell silent and then whispered faintly, 
"Yet I too long to go" (493). 13 
 
 The social critic Margaret Wertheim sees "a digital version of [St. John of 
Patmos's] Heavenly City" in digital life generally and in Gibson's cyberspace (258). We 
live in it as, and amid, information, potentially independent of the bodies from which we 
began: in this it resembles the way that our minds can seem to escape from our 
circumstances when we read. The very latest stories about cyberspace use new media and 
information technology to accentuate the already existing sense that it is a place fit for 
ghosts. Jeff Noon’s “Sparkletown” series (2011-12), told entirely in 140-character tweets 
and available only online, depicts a “Shadowrealm of ghosts, loners, artificial angels” 
after the “Crash of the Digital Age,” where computers have ceased to function, but 
uncanny digital images float through the air (“Sparkletown”).  Jennifer Egan’s story 
“Black Box” (2012), also composed in tweets, describes a cyborg agent whose links to a 
net of computers let her become "fully detached from your physical self" (Egan).  
 
 A third sort of sf afterlife imagines resurrection: you come back in another  
physical body—though you may not be you (and there may be more than one of “you”). 
The longest and most obvious instance of such an afterlife must be Philip Jose Farmer’s 
Riverworld novels (1966-80), in which everyone who has ever lived has been brought 
back to life on a constructed planet: Farmer’s characters include historical figures from 
incompatible periods, such as Mozart and Mark Twain. (Since nobody on Riverworld can 
die, characters can travel from place to place by killing themselves and winding up 
elsewhere—the “Suicide Express”). Other science fictional resurrections-in-body pursue 
narrower goals. In Tiptree's "The Girl Who Was Plugged In,", the ugly, sad P. Burke 
almost succeeds in committing suicide, but returns to a sort of life as the hidden 
controller for Delphi, a beautiful celebrity body in a world of remote-controlled beautiful 
celebrity bodies. Delphi seems more real, hence gets more attention, than her rivals, 
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because she has such a passionate controller to serve as her soul: are they one living 
person, or two? Who is the character, who the creator, which one (if either) is alive? 
 
 Sf afterlives of the second kind tend to dramatize philosophical problems of 
solipsism and nihilism; afterlives of this third kind, as Clark observes, tend to explore 
philosophical problems about the continuity of personal identity (How to Live Forever 
80). They ask not only what counts as you, but what other people will recognize as you, 
and when that recognition matters to your sense of yourself.  What if—as in essays by the 
philosopher Derek Parfit and the sf writer Larry Niven—a malfunctioning teleporter 
creates two of you, one at your starting point, one at your destination? 14 What if, as in Pat 
Cadigan's "Pretty Boy Crossover" (1986), you still look like you, don’t age, “don’t have 
to die any more,” but exist henceforward only as an image onscreen? (314) Such 
questions arose in earlier sf too. Take C. L. Moore's "No Woman Born"(1944), in which 
a celebrity actor, dancer and singer dies, or nearly dies, in a fire and comes back in a 
cyborg body. Deirdre's ex-manager quarrels with the cyborg's inventor, and with himself, 
about who she now is: "In spite of himself he said 'Deirdre!.... This is Deirdre!" then "No, 
not Deirdre—not human." "I'm still myself," she says later, and she ought to know (274, 
283).  The inventor thinks that he, like Doctor Frankenstein, has "created life," but he is 
wrong, since what he has accomplished is not life ex novo but a form of resurrection: the 
cyborg is Deirdre, back from the dead (302). 
 
Critics of cyberpunk, the pessimistic sf subgenre more or less inaugurated by 
Neuromancer, tend to see its figures for the hereafter without seeing its connection to 
other, earlier, science-fictional afterlives. For Ilana Ben-Tov, "the essence of cyberpunk 
is the afterlife: the invented world, the technological Eden, that we look towards as an 
escape, not merely from death... but also from having to face ourselves" (175). Scott 
Bukatman  sees in cyberpunk not only the posthumous but the posthuman. Science fiction 
in the 1980s and 1990s provided a "new terminal experience," with computers (terminals) 
canceling out (terminating) human control of human bodies, as in such clear examples of 
science-fictional posthumousness as Neuromancer, UBIK, and John Varley's "Overdrawn 
at the Memory Bank" (1976) (118, 93-99). "In science fiction," he concludes, "the death 
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of the subject is continually acted out in a form that yields a rebirth on another plane" 
(281).  The “death of the subject" in this Foucauldian sense (and its replacement by other 
units of analysis) becomes, in Bukatman's examples, both literalized and undercut by the 
persistence after death of these works' fictional characters. Cyberspace is indeed, as 
Wertheim says, like heaven; stories about it are stories about what happens when our 
minds, or spirits, look past the milieux and the bodies we already know. But so, in 
potentia and often as realized, are stories about Mars, and stories about generation ships, 
and stories about relativistic time dilation, and about first contact (as we will see below), 
and about almost every other topos that readers of science fiction recognize. 
 
A fourth sort of sf afterlife involves discontinuities in time: its characters skip 
over their own deaths, experiencing a future that precedes their own present and past, or 
escaping the line of secular time. “Time travel,” writes Clark, “especially the kind that 
allows for alternative worldlines, makes it possible to transcend this world, and so to 
know ourselves to be immortal in a... non-linear sense” (How to Live Forever 174). Not 
all time-travel stories realize that possibility; most early ones did not.15 “Time travel was 
the purest expression of interwar science fiction’s general interest in the future,” writes 
John Cheng, and most pulp-era time-travel stories “placed the past, present and future 
within a single historical line” (183).  And yet later SF authors could take use time travel 
to remove their protagonists from precisely that stream of time, to look on a lifespan, a 
history, as if from above or outside, to furnish more metaphors for the experience of 
reading, and to consider the contradictions involved in an apparently secular imagination 
of life after death. 
  
That is what Asimov does in The End of Eternity (1955), whose eponymous 
“Eternity” names both a physical place, a home base, “outside” time, and the time-
traveling elite who live and work there. This elite “work to plot out all the details of 
everywhe from the beginning of Eternity,” and “try to plot out all the infinite possibilities 
of all the might-have-beens and pick out a might-have-been that is better than what is and 
decide where in Time we can make a tiny little change to twist the is to the might-be and 
we have a new is” (72). People join Eternity through a process that sounds like dying: 
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“Only a human being out of Time, a Timer, could become an Eternal... He was taken 
beyond the veil of Eternity after a last agonized farewell to his family. (Even then it was 
made clear to him that whatever else happened he would never return)” (21). Eternity’s  
agents (unseen by ordinary mortals, or Timers) work like angels, though they are also like 
colonial operatives, plotting whatever seems best for the Timers “below.” At the end of 
the novel, a final change in reality brings Eternity to its own end, and history can take 
place with no more interference from “above”: rejecting ideologies of benevolent empire, 
the novel also suggests that we might be better off without revealed religion, and without 
the promise of an afterlife. 
 
More recent science fiction can represent an afterlife through time travel that 
seems to run more than two ways: its characters travel not only backward or forward in 
otherwise linear time, but in another sort of time entirely. These sorts of characters 
(especially if they are narrators) can prompt innovations in narrative form. Kurt 
Vonnegut’s Billy Pilgrim and Winston Rumfoord, from The Sirens of Titan (1959) and 
Slaughterhouse-Five (1969) are the best-known such characters, but there are others, 
among them the circular, self-begetting time traveler of Heinlein’s much anthologized 
“All You Zombies” (1958) and the teenagers in Tiptree’s “Backward, Turn Backward” 
(1988) who switch personalities with their future selves. Charles Yu’s How to Live Safely 
in a Science Fictional Universe (2010), much of which takes place inside a time machine, 
consists largely of chatty meditations on this sort of transfigured narrative time: its 
protagonist, “a certified network technician for T-class personal-use chronogrammatical 
vehicles,” fears that his “Tense Operator might be breaking down. It’s happening now. Or 
maybe not.... Maybe it broken down a long time ago” (5). Not by coincidence, he spends 
most of the novel seeking his lost, and perhaps deceased, father: the book is both 
metafiction, and elegy. 
 
Perhaps the most elegant science fictional narrator to exit linear time is Louise 
Banks, from Ted Chiang's novella "Story of Your Life" (1999). Banks, an academic 
linguist, must communicate with aliens new to Earth. The ideographs of their language, 
Heptapod B, present events not "in terms of cause and effect," but as manifestations of 
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preexisting necessity: "When Heptapod B truly reigns," Louise says, "I experience past 
and future all at once" (154).16 Louise tells her story, addressed to her daughter, out of 
sequence, beginning and ending with the night she conceived that daughter, who died, or 
dies, or will die: because she can think in Heptapod B, her English requires new tenses 
and new moods-- for example, the present-as-future-perfect used for the past: "I 
remember one afternoon when you are five years old, after you have come home from 
kindergarten. You'll be coloring with your crayons while I grade papers” (127). 
 
Louise speaks about her life not so much from after its end as from outside it, 
from something like Charles Taylor’s notion of “higher time.” Taylor distinguishes this 
alternate temporality, strongly associated with Western religion, from the “single profane 
timeline” of day-to-day life and year-to-year history,  “the horizontal flow of secular 
time” (195, 59).  If everything happens at once, for her, and by necessity, then Louise's 
daughter (the reader-figure, the one whose "life" this "story" spans) belongs to the world 
of the dead as soon as she is born. And yet she also belongs among the living even 
though she has already died. Chiang's story works as an allegory of reading, in which 
authors can create, and readers can apprehend, narratives “all at once”; it could not be 
other than science fiction, nor could it be anything but words, since its prose relies 
thoroughly on what Csicsery-Ronay calls the "first beauty" of sf, its power to create new 
kinds of language (13). That power cannot in turn be separated from sf’s ability to look 
beyond—to imagine narrators who look beyond—the boundaries of a life that ends at 
death, within the constraints of plausibility and consistency that differentiate sf from 
older non-realist forms.  
 
     * 
 
 These ways to represent the afterlife in science fiction—as “Heaven” in space, as 
a historical future, as a realm for intangible spirits or souls, as a point of view outside 
secular, one-way time— also become ways in which science fiction can represent itself to 
itself: is it an escape from the body, as in Tiptree? A way to ask how we know we are 
alive, as in Dick? A way to suggest that digital culture calls into question all our 
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assumptions about the relationship between bodies and minds, as in Gibson or Cadigan or 
Bukatman? These representations also highlight the supposed rivalry between sf as such 
and religious doctrine, preeminently the Christian religious doctrines that have dominated 
the Atlantic cultures in which science fiction arose. It is no accident that Chiang, in the 
book whose centerpiece is “Story of Your Life,” devotes other stories to explicit 
reworkings, in SF terms, of concepts taken straight from Jewish and Christian doctrines: 
the fall of Babel retold from the point of view of a frustrated construction worker  in 
“Tower of Babylon” (1990), the Calvinist problem of arbitrary election in “Hell Is the 
Absence of God” (2001). 
 
Parodies of sf often turn out to be parodies of the idea that we can know, or even 
imagine, what will come after us. Such parodies are attacks—corrosive or whimsical—on 
the idea of an afterlife that we can know. Fredrik Pohl's Gateway (1977) is both fine sf 
and a parody of sf: its intricate world-building and complex denouement both represent, 
and mock, the idea that the future beyond our own deaths is something we can know. The 
interstellar "prospectors" of Pohl's novel, among them the antihero Robinette (Bob) 
Broadhead, fly spaceships built by the mysterious, unseen Heechee (a kind of deus 
absconditus) that go automatically to destinations unknown; their dangerous trips out of 
caves in a womblike asteroid suggest both birth and death (65). Bob escapes in a 
spaceship from a black hole, but his lover Klara gets stuck in orbit around that black hole, 
where a minute for her is "a year by clock time" on Earth. She becomes immortal, but 
unable to act, "stuck in her instant and eternal fall" (265, 235). 
 
Gateway and its sequels together include all four types of science-fictional life 
after death: physical survival, an immaterial realm for the soul, a new body, and an 
escape from one-way secular time. As the sequels become less ironic, more 
conventionally heroic, more in line with sf fans' expectations, Pohl contrives to depict a 
knowable afterlife after all.  On a satellite nicknamed "Heechee Heaven," discovered in 
Beyond the Blue Event Horizon (1980), a set of "programs and databases for the so-called 
Dead Men" (holographs of extinct spacefarers) let humans unlock some secrets of 
Heechee technology; in Heechee Rendezvous (1984), that technology enables a for-profit 
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company called "Here After storage," where dead people can have their minds preserved 
(126, 128). "What you call 'life,'" says one preserved mind, "is really only a sort of 
entr'acte to the real existence you get here. I just can't understand why people put it off 
for so long!" (289). Bob dies within Heechee Rendezvous, saying "There... is... no... 
hereafter."  He ends up discovering one nonetheless: "I was dead," he recalls, but "did 
not, however, stay that way." Instead he becomes "a disembodied clutter of databits in fan 
storage," which amounts to: "Yes. Heaven" (289, 292, 312). The apparently useless 
Heechee objects called "fans" turn out to be data-storage devices, fit to preserve entire 
personalities, including Bob's, and "Fan" turns out to be a pun. To accept the premises of 
science fiction—to stop undermining them, to treat hope and the future and heroism as 
something other than a black hole—is for Pohl to accept what "fans" want science fiction 
to do; it is to accept a "Heaven" after all. 
 
If sf tends to substitute the future, a "cold heaven," or a more enticing "fan 
storage" for orthodox versions of Heaven and Hell, it is no wonder that a work of putative 
sf hostile (as Gateway is not) to science as such should warn against such substitutions. 
C. S. Lewis' Out of the Silent Planet (1938) does just that: "If we could even effect in one 
percent of our readers a change-over from the conception of Space to the conception of 
Heaven," muses Lewis' hero, Ransom, "we should have made a beginning" (167).  Robert 
Scholes and Eric Rabkin, in their history of the genre, call Lewis's work "anti-science 
fiction" set explicitly against sf's "invasion of religious space" (43). So, in one reading, is 
Wolfe's "Memorare," whose heroes explore mausoleums built into hollow asteroids: a 
particularly fascinating asteroid, apparently an Elysium, turns out to be a hallucinatory 
hell, where trapped men starve to death believing they live at ease, drinking sewage they 
take to be tea. When the heroes escape and reveal the illusion, one tells another "You 
ruined their paradise" (133). Is it the illusion of a technological replacement for Heaven 
that Wolfe, an outspoken Catholic, demolishes here? Or does the story cast doubt, instead 
(as Gateway does; as the sequels to Gateway do not) on any attempts to imagine a 
Heaven at all? 
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 “Wth its combination of the rational and the miraculous,” writes the sf critic and 
medievalist Edward James, “sf fulfills a role once filled by religion” (106). Mark Rose, 
writing in 1981, agreed: "one of sf's principal cultural functions," Rose explained, 
"appears to be to produce narratives that mediate between spiritualistic and materialistic 
worldviews" (40, 45). The natural sciences and their methods present no logically 
necessary conflict with the tenets of most contemporary religions.17 But here we must 
distinguish between religion, even revealed religion, generally and religious claims about 
the afterlife. More than (say) the existence of God or the problem of evil, questions of 
immortality, the afterlife and the soul have at least seemed amenable to experiment, from 
nineteenth-century spiritualists, to later attempts to weigh the soul at death and transcribe 
messages from beyond, to the contemporary study of Near-Death Experiences (NDEs).18 
From the frustrations attendant on such inquiries, from collisions between what we want 
from “science” and what we get, science fiction has one of its reasons to come into being.  
 
Most Americans say they believe in Heaven, even though (as McDannell and 
Lang write) “few Western Christians have not been influenced by a skeptical perspective 
on life after death,” and many American readers adhere to no creed, or to none that 
describes an afterlife  (307, 352). The most widely noted American depictions of the 
afterlife today are not science fiction but (to quote Gary Scott Smith) “pop angelology,” 
memoirs of near-death experiences, novels marketed specifically for religious believers, 
“songs about heaven and discussions of the afterlife on talk shows” (180). I do not want 
to suggest that sf has replaced religion in general, or nonfiction versions of Heaven in 
particular, within most American readers’ lives. Rather, my point is that sf continues to 
provide versions of an afterlife that do not depend on religious revelation, nor on this-
worldly proof, both because (to adopt Suvin’s terms) they belong to a literature of 
cognitive estrangement, whose novums are presented as cognitively explicable, and 
because they are presented as fictions, requiring nothing more than the proverbial 
suspension of disbelief.  SF’s intimate relationship with notions of the afterlife shows 
what we seem to need either fiction, or faith, to give; and one of those gifts is a sense of 
life after death. 
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I have been arguing, not that SF can or should replace religion tout court, but that 
it can displace, compete with, transform into fiction, and replace with fiction, ideas of life 
after death, of a knowable future beyond the death of the body, ideas that until the birth 
of SF were strongly associated with religious belief. These ideas also give many sf 
writers metaphors for sf itself: to learn “how to live safely in a science-fictional universe” 
is to learn how to live with, and how to imagine a life beyond, our death. Since it is the 
literature of imagined futures, science fiction engages, as most realist fiction cannot, with 
whether we can “see our life as going beyond the bounds of its ‘natural’ scope between 
birth and death,” “beyond ‘this life’” (20). Charles Taylor (whom I have just been 
quoting) seems to mean, by “beyond ‘this life,’” a form of sight, or imagination, that 
encompasses both the idea of a (temporal) future and the idea of another (material or 
spiritual) world, ideas which are the province of science fiction too. 
 
 Attuned from its outset to an explicable future, science fiction was bound to 
produce, almost despite itself, versions, in space or in cyberspace or in undiscovered 
terrestrial climes, of what happens after we die. And these versions have at least to make 
sense to an empirically minded reader, must not depend on revelation, even if they also 
hint (as in Wolfe’s “Memorare”) that we are sinners who cannot trust in appearances, or 
fallible creatures whose wishes can mislead. Science fiction is part of the history of 
reactions to the rise of technology, to industrial capitalism, to the Enlightenment and the 
scientific method, and it is part of the diversification and fertilization of fictive genres 
made possible by the expansion of the reading public in the late nineteenth and 
throughout the twentieth century. But it is also part of the history of Heaven, the long 
chain of Western depictions of the afterlife, whose earlier links include St. Augustine, 
Dante, Calvin and Swedenborg. 
 
 Sf will cease to exist, writes Veronica Hollinger, only when and if it "becomes a 
present-tense kind of literature” (217-18). It arises when readers and writers believe that 
the future will not resemble the present, because the present is not like the past. That 
claim informs every overview of the genre, from Alkon to Isaac Asimov, Jameson, Ken 
McLeod, Suvin, and Csicsery-Ronay, Jr.19 Yet critics’ accounts of sf as a literature of the 
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future have not emphasized one aspect by which the future must differ from our present; 
eventually, we will not be there. "Since the Enlightenment," agrees Jennifer Michael 
Hecht, "scientific progress has been imagined as a replacement for religious eschatology, 
with worldly utopia replacing heavenly bliss" (7). But science fiction suggests that such 
imagined replacements will always seem incomplete: we want to imagine not only a 
world beyond us, but a way in which we can be there. 
 
Taylor denies “that the world is proceeding towards an overcoming or relegation 
of religion” (594); the persistence, indeed the inevitability, of tropes for the afterlife, 
versions of life after death, within science fiction (a genre sometimes associated with the 
relegation or decline of the supernatural, and of religion) seems to be evidence on 
Taylor’s side. The persistent connection between versions of Heaven, or of Purgatory, or 
of the spirit world (on the one hand) and science fiction (on the other) becomes further 
evidence for what Taylor calls “the sedimentation of the past in the present,” the way that 
current unbelief recognizes that it arose from a matrix of prior belief (268). To see how 
intimately science fiction has been involved with questions of life after death, of the 
survival of the spirit, is to see how short a step it would have been for L. Ron Hubbard 
(for instance) from the community of science fiction fans to the Church of Scientology, 
with its science-fictional founding ideas. At the same time science fiction remains, in 
general, aware of itself as fiction: if it did not, it would not be able to mediate, for its 
twentieth- and twenty-first century readers, between empiricism and imaginative 
consolation in the way that sf—and sf in particular—does. 
 
I have been arguing that much science fiction provides both a rival and a 
replacement for the afterlife as described in revealed religion; that versions of the afterlife 
in science fiction echo versions of the afterlife constructed outside SF; that science fiction 
provides, through versions of the afterlife, metaphors for what it is like to read it; that in 
doing so, science fiction reflects the persistence in empirically- and in secular-minded 
readers of a strong desire for life after death, a desire that for such readers cannot be 
satisfied by nonfictional means. In making these intertwined arguments about the history 
(by and large, the American history) of science fiction, I have also been suggesting that 
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science fiction, considered as such, belongs to the much longer line of depictions that 
McDannell and Lang, and Taylor, among others, pursue. If we want to know how the 
West has seen the afterlife, how Western and in particular American readers have tried to 
imagine what happens after we die, we must pursue the history of what is now called 
religion, from antiquity to the present, but as we approach the late nineteenth and 
twentieth—and especially the twenty-first—century, we should also keep science fiction 
in mind. 
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1 According to Darko Suvin’s theory—the first to acquire wide influence within 
academe—sf is distinguished from other non-realist fiction by “cognitive estrangement,” 
a novum that makes the world of the text unlike our world, in ways that can in principle, 
through experiment or through reason, be understood. For other important general 
theories, see Alkon; Csicsery-Ronay, Jr.; Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future; Rose; 
Scholes and Rabkin; and also Brian Aldiss, Trillion Year Spree (New York: Athenaeum, 
1986); Carl Freedman, Science Fiction and Critical Theory (Middletown, Conn.: 
Wesleyan University Press, 2000); James Gunn, ed., Speculations on Speculation 
(Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow, 2005).  On “science fiction’s historical emergence” and its 
“community of readers and enthusiasts” (11, 16), see also Cheng; on those institutions in 
the late twentieth century, see Camille Bacon-Smith, Science Fiction Culture 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). 
2 On science fiction and religion generally, a reliable, recent, rapid overview is Clark,  
“Science Fiction and Religion”: though, as Clark writes, sf “seems well suited to the 
needs and fantasies of an irreligious age,” sf nonetheless considers “how we are to live in 
a world immensely larger, older, grander and more forbidding than we had supposed” 
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